19.06.26 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

PART I

THE IMPUGNED ORDER IS A COLOURABLE EXERCISE OF POWER AND A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE REMAND ORDER PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT

1.
At the outset, the petitioner submits that the present case is not a routine challenge to a departmental punishment.

2.
The impugned order dated 01.08.2023 stands on a fundamentally different footing because it has been passed after this Hon'ble Court had already intervened and quashed the earlier punishment order and revisional order in CWJC No. 441 of 2023.

3.
Therefore, the central issue before this Hon'ble Court is not merely whether the disciplinary authority arrived at a correct conclusion.

4.
The real issue is whether the disciplinary authority faithfully complied with the mandate of this Hon'ble Court.

5.
The answer, with utmost respect, is clearly in the negative.

THE TRUE SCOPE OF THE REMAND ORDER

1.
This Hon'ble Court, while setting aside the earlier punishment order, recorded a specific finding that neither the disciplinary authority nor the revisional authority had considered the petitioner's detailed defence representation.

2.
The Court specifically observed that the grounds raised by the petitioner to controvert the inquiry report had not been discussed.

3.
Consequently, the punishment order and revisional order were quashed.

4.
The remand was not granted for the purpose of enabling the authority to reproduce the same conclusion in a different format.

5.
The remand required:

(a) fresh application of mind;
(b) objective consideration of Annexure-32;
(c) independent examination of evidence;
(d) reasoned findings on each substantial defence raised by the petitioner.

1.
The impugned order fails on all four counts.

ANNEXURE-32 WAS THE HEART OF THE REMAND

1.
The defence representation filed by the petitioner was not a routine denial.

2.
It raised specific legal and factual objections, namely:

(a) the primary charge of illegal demand of money was not proved;
(b) punishment was proposed on the basis of allegations not contained in the charge-sheet;
(c) the electronic evidence was inadmissible;
(d) the mandatory requirements of Section 65B were not satisfied;
(e) material documents had been withheld;
(f) the complainant had not been examined;
(g) no witness had been examined;
(h) the proceeding was a case of no evidence;
(i) chronology of events contradicted the prosecution story;
(j) Rule 17 of Bihar CCA Rules had been violated.

1.
These were not peripheral objections.

2.
These objections constituted the very foundation of the defence.

3.
Yet the disciplinary authority has not dealt with them individually.

4.
There is no finding on Section 65B.

5.
There is no finding on non-supply of documents.

6.
There is no finding on Rule 17(12), Rule 17(13) or Rule 17(14).

7.
There is no finding regarding the contradictory timeline.

8.
There is no finding regarding the absence of the complainant.

9.
There is no finding regarding the inquiry officer's own conclusion that the charge of illegal demand was not proved.

10.
Therefore the defect identified by this Hon'ble Court continues to survive.

COLOURABLE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REMAND ORDER

1.
The law does not recognise mechanical compliance.

2.
Compliance must be real and substantive.

3.
An authority cannot merely state that the defence was "considered" without demonstrating how it was considered.

4.
If such a mechanical exercise is permitted, every remand order passed by a constitutional court would become meaningless.

5.
What has occurred in the present case is not reconsideration.

6.
It is post-facto justification.

7.
The disciplinary authority has started with a predetermined conclusion and attempted to construct reasons thereafter.

8.
Such exercise amounts to a colourable exercise of power.

PRE-DETERMINED MIND IS APPARENT FROM THE RECORD

1.
The chronology itself demonstrates pre-determination.

2.
First punishment order.

3.
Rejection of review.

4.
Intervention by this Hon'ble Court.

5.
Remand for reconsideration.

6.
Repetition of substantially identical findings.

7.
Reduction of punishment from three increments to two increments does not constitute fresh adjudication.

8.
It merely demonstrates an attempt to preserve the original conclusion.

9.
The reasoning remains substantially unchanged.

10.
The evidence remains unchanged.

11.
The findings remain unchanged.

12.
The defects remain unchanged.

13.
Only the quantum has changed.

14.
Such conduct defeats the very purpose of judicial review.

NON-SPEAKING ORDER DESPITE JUDICIAL DIRECTION

1.
In Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that reasons are the heartbeat of every conclusion.

2.
A reasoned order is the minimum safeguard against arbitrariness.

3.
Reasons demonstrate that the authority has actually applied its mind.

4.
Reasons reassure the affected person that justice has been done.

5.
Reasons facilitate judicial review.

6.
The impugned order contains conclusions.

7.
It does not contain reasoning.

8.
It records that the defence has been considered.

9.
It does not explain why the defence has been rejected.

10.
Such an order cannot survive constitutional scrutiny under Articles 14 and 21.

CONSEQUENCE

1.
Once it is shown that the authority has failed to carry out the directions contained in the remand order in their true spirit, the impugned order becomes unsustainable irrespective of the merits of the underlying charge.

2.
The impugned order is therefore liable to be quashed on this ground alone.

3.
The petitioner respectfully submits that the disciplinary authority has acted in direct derogation of the mandate issued by this Hon'ble Court and the impugned order deserves to be struck down as a colourable and mechanical exercise of power.

PART II

THE FINDINGS ARE PERVERSE, THE PROCEEDING IS A CASE OF NO EVIDENCE, AND THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN PUNISHED FOR A CHARGE NEVER FRAMED

1.
The petitioner respectfully submits that even assuming the remand issue is kept aside, the impugned order is independently liable to be quashed because the findings recorded therein are perverse, unsupported by evidence and contrary to the record itself.

2.
The present case falls squarely within the well-recognized category of a "Case of No Evidence".

3.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that although strict rules of the Evidence Act may not apply to departmental proceedings, findings must nevertheless rest upon some legally acceptable evidence.

4.
Suspicion, conjecture, departmental assumptions or preconceived opinions cannot substitute proof.

THE ORIGINAL CHARGE HAS FAILED

1.
The charge-sheet dated 21.12.2018 was founded upon one central allegation.

2.
The allegation was that the petitioner had demanded illegal money from the concerned CDPO.

3.
This was the foundation of the entire proceeding.

4.
This was the misconduct alleged.

5.
This was the charge which the petitioner was called upon to answer.

6.
However, the Inquiry Officer himself recorded that the allegation regarding illegal demand of money was not established from the available material.

7.
The inquiry report itself acknowledges that the evidence did not conclusively establish the alleged demand.

8.
Therefore, the foundation of the charge-sheet collapsed during the inquiry itself.

9.
Once the principal charge failed, the proceeding ought to have ended in favour of the petitioner.

10.
Instead of recording exoneration, the authorities shifted the basis of punishment altogether.

11.
The proceeding thereafter underwent a complete transformation.

12.
The charge-sheet alleged demand of money.

13.
The punishment order proceeds on alleged objectionable language.

14.
The charge-sheet alleged corruption.

15.
The punishment order relies upon alleged misconduct of speech.

16.
This shift is fatal in law.

PUNISHMENT FOR A CHARGE NEVER FRAMED

1.
The petitioner respectfully submits that one of the most fundamental principles of disciplinary jurisprudence is that a government servant can only be punished for a charge which has been framed and communicated.

2.
A delinquent employee must know beforehand the precise allegation he is required to meet.

3.
The right to defend necessarily presupposes knowledge of the charge.

4.
The charge-sheet never alleged:

(a) abusive language;
(b) insulting language;
(c) indecent language;
(d) threatening language;
(e) misconduct towards a woman officer by use of objectionable expressions.

1.
Yet these allegations ultimately became the basis of punishment.

2.
Such action is constitutionally impermissible.

3.
In Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal, (1971) 1 SCC 239, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that charges must be specific and definite.

4.
In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 3 SCC 454, the Court held that vague or undisclosed allegations cannot sustain punishment.

5.
In Anil Gilurkar v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, (2011) 14 SCC 379, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that findings cannot travel beyond the charge-sheet.

6.
The impugned order violates this settled principle.

7.
The petitioner has therefore been punished for a charge which never existed in the departmental proceeding.

THIS IS A CLASSIC CASE OF NO EVIDENCE

1.
The disciplinary authority seeks to sustain punishment without proving the charge through legally acceptable evidence.

2.
There is no direct evidence of demand of money.

3.
There is no documentary evidence proving demand of money.

4.
There is no oral evidence proving demand of money.

5.
There is no witness who states on oath that the petitioner demanded money.

6.
There is no contemporaneous complaint proving demand of money.

7.
There is no recovery.

8.
There is no trap.

9.
There is no corroboration.

10.
There is therefore no evidence capable of proving the principal charge.

11.
The Supreme Court in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1978) 3 SCC 366 held that disciplinary findings must be supported by evidence which reasonably points towards guilt.

12.
Suspicion cannot take the place of proof.

13.
Conjectures cannot take the place of evidence.

14.
Departmental belief cannot take the place of evidence.

15.
The present case suffers from all three defects.

ABSENCE OF THE MOST MATERIAL WITNESS

1.
The entire proceeding revolves around the alleged interaction with Smt. Madhurima Prasad.

2.
She is the central figure in the entire allegation.

3.
Surprisingly, she was never examined as a witness.

4.
No examination-in-chief.

5.
No cross-examination.

6.
No opportunity to test her version.

7.
No opportunity to examine surrounding circumstances.

8.
No opportunity to examine motive.

9.
No opportunity to test credibility.

10.
No opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the alleged conversation.

11.
The disciplinary authority has therefore accepted an accusation without producing the accuser.

12.
Such a course strikes at the heart of natural justice.

13.
Rule 17(14) of the Bihar CCA Rules expressly contemplates production of evidence and witnesses.

14.
The petitioner was denied that statutory protection.

15.
The proceeding therefore stands vitiated.

NO WRITTEN COMPLAINT BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM

1.
The record itself reveals another extraordinary feature.

2.
There is no written complaint from the alleged victim forming the basis of disciplinary action.

3.
The proceeding is therefore based upon materials generated through administrative correspondence and electronic recordings rather than a formal complaint by the person allegedly affected.

4.
The absence of a contemporaneous complaint assumes significance because the entire prosecution story depends upon the alleged victim's version.

5.
Yet that version never came before the Inquiry Officer through admissible evidence.

6.
This creates a serious evidentiary vacuum.

FATAL CHRONOLOGICAL CONTRADICTIONS

1.
The petitioner specifically pointed out a factual contradiction in Annexure-32.

2.
The audio recording is stated to be dated 20.09.2017.

3.
The alleged discussion relates to the Minister's visit.

4.
Official records show that the Minister's visit occurred on 19.09.2017.

5.
This chronology creates a serious inconsistency requiring explanation.

6.
The petitioner specifically raised this issue.

7.
The disciplinary authority has not dealt with it.

8.
An authority cannot ignore a material factual contradiction and still claim to have considered the defence.

9.
Such omission demonstrates non-application of mind.

THE FINDINGS ARE THEREFORE PERVERSE

1.
In Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Supreme Court held that findings unsupported by evidence or based on inadmissible material are perverse and liable to be interfered with in judicial review.

2.
The present case falls squarely within that principle.

3.
The principal charge is unproved.

4.
The complainant is absent.

5.
Material witnesses are absent.

6.
Documentary support is absent.

7.
Independent corroboration is absent.

8.
The petitioner is punished for an allegation never framed.

9.
Material contradictions remain unanswered.

10.
The inquiry officer himself did not find the principal charge proved.

11.
Yet punishment has been imposed.

12.
Such findings cannot be sustained in law.

13.
They are not merely erroneous.

14.
They are perverse.

15.
They constitute a classic "Case of No Evidence".

16.
The impugned order therefore deserves to be quashed on this ground alone.

PART III

THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING STANDS VITIATED DUE TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF RULE 17 OF THE BIHAR GOVERNMENT SERVANTS (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND APPEAL) RULES, 2005 AND ARTICLE 311(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

1.
The petitioner respectfully submits that the impugned punishment order is liable to be quashed not only because the findings are unsupported by evidence, but also because the inquiry itself was conducted in direct violation of the mandatory procedural safeguards prescribed under Rule 17 of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005.

2.
Rule 17 is not a procedural formality.

3.
It is the statutory embodiment of the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

4.
Compliance with Rule 17 is therefore mandatory.

5.
Non-compliance strikes at the very jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority.

6.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where procedural safeguards constituting reasonable opportunity are denied, the entire proceeding becomes void.

RULE 17 IS A STATUTORY SAFEGUARD AGAINST ARBITRARY DISCIPLINARY ACTION

1.
Rule 17 lays down a complete code governing departmental inquiries involving major penalties.

2.
The Rule contemplates:

(a) disclosure of charges;
(b) disclosure of relied upon documents;
(c) production of evidence;
(d) examination of witnesses;
(e) right of cross-examination;
(f) fair adjudication by an independent Inquiry Officer;
(g) reasoned findings based upon evidence.

1.
The object of the Rule is to prevent arbitrary punishment.

2.
The Rule ensures that disciplinary findings emerge from evidence rather than departmental assumptions.

3.
Unfortunately, almost every important safeguard contained in Rule 17 has been violated in the present case.

VIOLATION OF RULE 17(12): FAILURE TO PRODUCE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

1.
Rule 17(12) contemplates production of documents necessary for a fair adjudication of the charges.

2.
The petitioner repeatedly requested documents which were indispensable for his defence.

3.
These included:

(a) source details of the audio recording;
(b) original electronic record;
(c) details of the recording device;
(d) identity of the person who recorded the conversation;
(e) date and time records;
(f) departmental file notings;
(g) forwarding communications;
(h) preservation records;
(i) custody records.

1.
These documents were directly relevant because the entire prosecution case depended upon the authenticity of the electronic recording.

2.
Yet these documents were never supplied.

3.
Without these materials, the petitioner could not effectively challenge:

(a) authenticity;
(b) authorship;
(c) source;
(d) integrity;
(e) continuity of possession.

1.
The denial of such documents amounts to denial of a meaningful defence.

2.
Consequently Rule 17(12) stands violated.

VIOLATION OF RULE 17(13): FAILURE TO RECORD REASONS FOR REFUSAL

1.
Rule 17(13) provides an additional safeguard.

2.
Where requested documents are not supplied, reasons must be recorded.

3.
This safeguard prevents arbitrary refusal.

4.
It ensures transparency.

5.
It allows subsequent judicial scrutiny.

6.
In the present case, the disciplinary machinery neither supplied the documents nor recorded legally sustainable reasons for refusing them.

7.
The statutory mandate of Rule 17(13) was therefore ignored.

8.
Such failure by itself vitiates the inquiry.

VIOLATION OF RULE 17(14): FAILURE TO PRODUCE WITNESSES

1.
Rule 17(14) is perhaps the most important safeguard in the entire inquiry process.

2.
It requires the Presenting Officer to produce witnesses and evidence in support of the charges.

3.
The Rule further protects the delinquent employee's right to cross-examine those witnesses.

4.
Cross-examination is not a technical ritual.

5.
It is one of the most effective tools known to law for testing truthfulness.

6.
It is through cross-examination that exaggeration, error, bias and fabrication are exposed.

7.
In the present case, the department failed to produce the most material witness.

8.
Smt. Madhurima Prasad was never examined.

9.
The alleged victim never entered the witness box.

10.
The petitioner was therefore denied the statutory right of cross-examination.

11.
Rule 17(14) consequently stands violated.

12.
Once the right of cross-examination is denied in respect of the principal witness, the entire inquiry loses its legal legitimacy.

THE INQUIRY OFFICER FAILED TO FUNCTION AS AN INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATOR

1.
The Bihar Government itself has issued instructions explaining the role of Inquiry Officers under Rule 17.

2.
The Inquiry Officer is expected to function as an impartial adjudicator.

3.
He is not expected to act as a prosecutor.

4.
He is not expected to defend departmental opinions.

5.
He is not expected to validate conclusions already reached by superior authorities.

6.
His sole duty is to examine evidence presented during the inquiry.

7.
The inquiry record reveals the exact opposite.

8.
Instead of insisting upon production of primary evidence, the inquiry proceeded on departmental assumptions.

9.
Instead of insisting upon witnesses, reliance was placed upon materials collected outside the inquiry.

10.
Such procedure destroys the independence contemplated under Rule 17.

THE VIOLATIONS HAVE CAUSED ACTUAL PREJUDICE

1.
The respondents may argue that procedural irregularities by themselves do not invalidate proceedings unless prejudice is shown.

2.
The petitioner respectfully submits that prejudice in the present case is self-evident.

3.
Had the requested documents been supplied, the petitioner could have challenged the authenticity of the recording.

4.
Had the complainant been produced, the petitioner could have cross-examined her.

5.
Had the source details been disclosed, the petitioner could have challenged the origin and integrity of the recording.

6.
Had Rule 17 been followed, the inquiry might have reached an entirely different conclusion.

7.
Therefore prejudice is not speculative.

8.
It is manifest from the record.

ARTICLE 311(2) STANDS VIOLATED

1.
Rule 17 derives constitutional force from Article 311(2).

2.
Article 311(2) guarantees reasonable opportunity of defence before civil consequences are imposed upon a government servant.

3.
The constitutional protection is not satisfied by issuing a charge-sheet alone.

4.
The opportunity must be real.

5.
It must be effective.

6.
It must be meaningful.

7.
A person denied documents cannot effectively defend himself.

8.
A person denied cross-examination cannot effectively defend himself.

9.
A person denied access to primary evidence cannot effectively defend himself.

10.
A person punished on materials never properly proved cannot be said to have received reasonable opportunity.

11.
Consequently the present proceeding violates Article 311(2).

SAROJ KUMAR SINHA FULLY COVERS THE PRESENT CASE

1.
In State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, the Supreme Court emphatically held that departmental inquiries cannot be treated as empty formalities.

2.
The Inquiry Officer must act fairly.

3.
The delinquent employee must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of defence.

4.
Findings cannot be recorded behind the back of the charged employee.

5.
The Court warned that failure to observe these principles renders the inquiry legally unsustainable.

6.
The facts of the present case fall squarely within the ratio of that judgment.

7.
The inquiry therefore stands vitiated.

CONSEQUENCE OF VIOLATION OF RULE 17

1.
Once mandatory safeguards under Rule 17 are violated, the disciplinary proceeding becomes unsustainable in law.

2.
Such violations go to the root of the proceeding.

3.
They are not curable irregularities.

4.
They affect the fairness of the entire adjudicatory process.

5.
The impugned punishment order is therefore liable to be quashed as being contrary to Rule 17 of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, contrary to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and contrary to the principles of natural justice.

6.
The petitioner respectfully submits that on this ground alone the writ petition deserves to be allowed with all consequential benefits.

PART IV

THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING RESTS UPON LEGALLY UNPROVED ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE; THE FSL REPORT CANNOT SUBSTITUTE PROOF; THE IMPUGNED ORDER IS THEREFORE LIABLE TO BE QUASHED WITHOUT FURTHER REMAND

1.
The petitioner respectfully submits that the present proceeding ultimately stands or falls on a single piece of alleged evidence, namely the so-called Audio Voice Clip.

2.
There is no independent eyewitness.

3.
There is no complainant's testimony.

4.
There is no contemporaneous complaint proving the allegation.

5.
There is no recovery.

6.
There is no trap proceeding.

7.
There is no corroborative documentary evidence.

8.
Consequently, the entire prosecution case rests exclusively upon an electronic record.

9.
Once that electronic record becomes legally doubtful, the entire disciplinary proceeding collapses.

THE DEPARTMENT NEVER ESTABLISHED THE SOURCE OF THE AUDIO RECORDING

1.
The first and most fundamental question in any electronic evidence case is:

Who created the recording?

1.
The respondents have never answered this question.

2.
The record does not disclose:

(a) who recorded the conversation;
(b) under whose instructions it was recorded;
(c) from which device it was recorded;
(d) where it was recorded;
(e) how it was transferred;
(f) how it was preserved;
(g) who handled it after recording;
(h) whether any editing took place;
(i) whether the original device was preserved.

1.
These are not technical objections.

2.
These questions go to the root of authenticity.

3.
Unless the source is proved, the authenticity of the recording remains doubtful.

4.
The petitioner repeatedly demanded these particulars.

5.
The respondents never supplied them.

6.
The disciplinary authority has completely ignored these objections.

NO CHAIN OF CUSTODY WAS EVER ESTABLISHED

1.
Modern electronic evidence jurisprudence rests upon the concept of chain of custody.

2.
The purpose of chain of custody is to demonstrate that the electronic record remained free from tampering from the moment of creation until production.

3.
In the present case no such chain has been established.

4.
There is no evidence showing:

(a) who possessed the recording initially;
(b) how it was stored;
(c) how it was copied;
(d) who transferred it to the department;
(e) who transmitted it to the FSL;
(f) whether it remained intact throughout.

1.
The respondents seek to rely upon the recording while simultaneously refusing to disclose its origin.

2.
Such a course is wholly inconsistent with fair adjudication.

ABSENCE OF SECTION 65B CERTIFICATE

1.
The petitioner specifically raised the issue that no certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act accompanied the electronic record.

2.
This objection was raised repeatedly before the disciplinary authority.

3.
Significantly, no such certificate appears in the list of relied upon documents.

4.
The charge-sheet specifically mentions the Audio Voice Clip.

5.
However, no separate Section 65B certificate is shown as a relied upon document.

6.
This omission is highly significant.

7.
Had such a certificate existed, it would necessarily have formed part of the record relied upon by the department.

8.
The absence of the certificate from the record strongly indicates that no such certificate was ever generated.

9.
Even after repeated objections by the petitioner, the respondents have never produced any valid certificate.

THE LAW DECLARED IN ANVAR P.V.

1.
In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that compliance with Section 65B is mandatory whenever secondary electronic evidence is relied upon.

2.
The Court rejected the earlier practice of proving electronic records through oral testimony alone.

3.
It was held that the certificate contemplated under Section 65B is a condition precedent for admissibility.

4.
Therefore, electronic evidence unsupported by statutory certification lacks legal foundation.

THE LAW REAFFIRMED IN ARJUN PANDITRAO

1.
The legal position was reaffirmed by a three-Judge Bench in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.

2.
The Supreme Court held that:

"The requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is mandatory."

1.
The Court further observed that oral evidence cannot substitute the certificate.

2.
The judgment leaves no ambiguity regarding the mandatory nature of the requirement.

3.
The respondents have never explained how the electronic evidence satisfies this requirement.

4.
The disciplinary authority has completely failed to address this legal objection.

THE STATE CANNOT AVOID THE ISSUE BY RELYING UPON THE NATURE OF DEPARTMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

1.
The respondents may argue that strict provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply to departmental inquiries.

2.
The petitioner does not dispute that proposition.

3.
However, the respondents cannot rely upon that principle to dispense with authenticity itself.

4.
The issue is not merely admissibility.

5.
The issue is reliability.

6.
The issue is authenticity.

7.
The issue is integrity of the electronic record.

8.
Even departmental proceedings require proof that the material relied upon is genuine.

9.
Otherwise fabricated recordings, edited clips and manipulated electronic records could become the basis of punishment.

10.
Such a proposition would destroy the rule of law.

THE FSL REPORT DOES NOT PROVE MISCONDUCT

1.
The respondents have placed substantial reliance upon the FSL report.

2.
The petitioner respectfully submits that even if the FSL report is accepted in its entirety, it does not prove the charge.

3.
At the highest, the FSL report indicates similarity of voice samples.

4.
Voice similarity and misconduct are entirely different issues.

5.
The FSL report cannot establish:

(a) illegal demand of money;
(b) corrupt motive;
(c) criminal intent;
(d) misconduct;
(e) context of conversation;
(f) completeness of recording;
(g) authenticity of recording process.

1.
The FSL expert was not certifying guilt.

2.
The FSL expert was merely expressing an opinion regarding voice comparison.

3.
The disciplinary authority has committed a fundamental error by treating voice identification as proof of misconduct.

4.
Such reasoning is legally unsustainable.

THE IMPUGNED FINDINGS ARE THEREFORE BASED UPON UNPROVED MATERIAL

1.
Once the electronic record becomes doubtful, the FSL report loses significance.

2.
Voice comparison is meaningful only when the source recording itself is shown to be genuine.

3.
If the origin of the recording is uncertain, voice comparison cannot cure the defect.

4.
The respondents have attempted to prove authenticity through voice similarity.

5.
Law requires the opposite.

6.
Authenticity must first be established.

7.
Only thereafter can expert comparison become relevant.

8.
This elementary requirement has not been satisfied.

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL ILLEGALITIES

1.
The petitioner respectfully submits that each defect identified herein independently vitiates the proceeding.

2.
Collectively, the defects make the continuation of punishment wholly indefensible.

3.
The principal charge was not proved.

4.
The petitioner was punished for a charge never framed.

5.
The complainant was never examined.

6.
Material witnesses were never produced.

7.
Relevant documents were withheld.

8.
Rule 17 was violated.

9.
Article 311(2) was violated.

10.
The remand order of this Hon'ble Court was not faithfully implemented.

11.
The electronic evidence remains legally unproved.

12.
The mandatory safeguards relating to electronic evidence were ignored.

13.
The FSL report was misconstrued.

14.
The findings are therefore perverse.

NO USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY A FRESH REMAND

1.
The petitioner has already undergone one complete round of litigation.

2.
The matter has already once been remanded by this Hon'ble Court.

3.
The disciplinary authority has already been granted a full opportunity to reconsider the matter.

4.
Despite such opportunity, the authority failed to cure the defects identified by this Hon'ble Court.

5.
The defects now identified are not procedural irregularities capable of being cured by another remand.

6.
They strike at the very foundation of the proceeding.

7.
The evidence itself is deficient.

8.
The principal charge itself failed.

9.
Consequently, a second remand would merely prolong injustice.

FINAL PRAYER

1.
In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, it is respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to:

(a) quash the impugned punishment order dated 01.08.2023;

(b) hold that the disciplinary proceeding stands vitiated by violation of natural justice, violation of Rule 17 of the Bihar CCA Rules, violation of Article 311(2), absence of evidence and reliance upon legally unproved electronic material;

(c) direct restoration of all consequential service benefits;

(d) direct re-fixation of pay, increments and pensionary benefits wherever affected;

(e) direct payment of consequential monetary benefits;

(f) grant any other relief deemed fit and proper in the interest of justice.

1.
The petitioner respectfully submits that constitutional fairness, statutory compliance and settled principles of administrative law all converge towards one conclusion:

The impugned punishment order cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed with all consequential benefits.


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